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North Korea’s Nuclear Test 
North Korea’s nuclear test serves several purposes. Its first purpose is to bolster the flagging legitimacy of the regime and, by drumming up war hysteria, achieve domestic mobilization in the face of mounting internal 
difficulties. Throughout North Korea’s turbulent history, the regime has periodically resorted to war hysteria, at 
times on even grander scale than  what we have recently seen. North Korea’s Songun (army-first) policy requires 
periodic crises to maintain the myth of enemy encirclement and the army prestige. If history is any judge, the 
North Koreans will step away from the brink when their domestic aims have been achieved.
Another reason for North Korea’s militancy, ironically, is to 
break out from international isolation. For years Pyongyang 
has sought direct dialogue with the United States with an eye 
to obtaining security guarantees and economic aid. Six party 
talks have put Pyongyang into a five-against-one situation, 
and although the North Koreans have accepted the format 
they do not regard them as a replacement for direct talks 
with Washington.
Thirdly, this latest round of militancy signals Pyongyang’s 
growing irritation with ‘hardline’ policies of Yi Myongbak’s 
conservative administration. Brandishing the new South 
Korean President a “national traitor,” Pyongyang awkwardly 
attempts to undermine 
his domestic standing 
and hopefully exacerbate 
conflict in US-South 
Korean relations. In 
view of this policy, Kim 
Jong Il’s condolences 
to the deceased South 
Korean President Roh 
Moo-hyun and the 
nuclear test are mutually 
reinforcing rather 
than contradictory 
measures.
Fourth, there is no doubt that Pyongyang is in great need of 
economic aid. The North Korean leadership believes that the 
US and South Korea have used economic levers to extract 
concessions and the current sabre-rattling, specifically the 
severance of economic contacts in the Kaesong industrial 
area, are a way for North Korea to signal its defiance to this 
economic pressure. At the same time the North Koreans 
are once again pumping-up tensions to raise the price of 
compliance once things get back to the negotiating table.
Fifth, North Korea badly needed a demonstration of a viable 
deterrent. The first atomic test (in October 2006) was an 
unconvincing performance; at the time, many observers 
thought it fizzled out. Despite significant progress in missile 
technology in the last few years, North Korea has not done 
as well as some military experts expected, as attested by the 
recent satellite launch fiasco. The A-bomb test erases any 
doubts about Pyongyang’s membership in the nuclear club 
- a serious deterrent by any measure.
Given the value of this deterrent, it is unlikely that Pyongyang 
would ever give it up, either for aid or for security guarantees. 
It may well negotiate and even agree to dismantle its nuclear 
programme. But living up to such promises would not only go 
against the essence of Songun politics but, from North Korea’s 
perspective, reduce the country’s international leverage. 
So whist we might expect negotiations and even progress 
we should not expect a solution to the North Korean 
nuclear problem.
Few options other than talks are on the table. A war on the 
Peninsula is unthinkable, not least because of South Korea’s 
vulnerability. Economic sanctions have been tried before and 
found to work very well as an alternative to doing nothing. 
China’s and Russia’s cooperation will be limited, as it has 
been before, and for a good reason: a genuine sanctions 
regime, which would leave North Korea completely isolated, 
could have extremely grave consequences for the viability 
of the regime - and that would be bad news for all parties 
involved. As long as there are talks about North Korea’s 
denuclearization, there is hope for calming the nerves of 
regional powers, in particular Japan, and so averting what 
potentially could be a very damaging nuclear arms race in 
the region.
There are, of course, reasons to worry, not least because we 
don’t know who is in charge in North Korea. Kim Jong Il may 
be strong, he may be weak, or he may be dead, for all we 
know; in any case, it is clear that the struggle for succession 
is already under way. What role the current nuclear crisis plays 
in this struggle is unclear, and there can be no guarantees 
that the nuclear button will not end up under the finger of an 
irrational maniac? The one shred of hope in such a scenario is 
that, as the historical precedent of Mao in the 1960s attests, 
nuclear-armed maniacs turn out much more rational than 
they may seem at first sight.
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